Wire Fraud in Title Companies: How to Protect Closings, Email, and Client Funds.

ALTURA NETWORKS · 5 MIN READ

A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR TITLE COMPANY TEAMS

A closing brings together buyers, sellers, lenders, agents, and a title team. Everyone is working toward the same deadline. A criminal may see that busy moment as a chance to send a false payment request and move money into the wrong account.

Title company wire fraud can begin with one convincing message. Reducing the risk takes clear payment rules, safer accounts, and employees who feel comfortable stopping to ask questions. The goal is to make careful checks part of every closing, even on a busy day.

IT security supports a title company’s wire verification process. It does not replace it. Email protection and safer sign-ins help protect your systems. Your team still needs to verify wire instructions through its approved process before funds move.

1. Why title companies are targeted

Title companies help coordinate transactions involving large amounts of money. They also work with people who may be buying or selling a home for the first time. Those clients may not know what a normal wire request should look like.

A closing involves many messages, documents, and deadlines. That gives criminals chances to pretend to be someone involved in the transaction. They may copy a lender’s name, a closer’s signature, or details from a real conversation.

When planning for wire fraud, title company leaders can ask: “What would we do if payment details changed an hour before closing?” The answer should be a clear process, not a rushed judgment call by one employee.

2. How wire fraud usually starts

An attack may start with a message about a shared document, a password problem, or updated closing details. The message pushes someone to click a link, enter a password, or trust new payment instructions.

For example, a closer receives a message that appears to come from a seller. It says the seller has changed banks and needs the proceeds sent elsewhere. The message mentions the right property and closing date, so it seems believable.

Those details do not prove the request is real. A criminal may have learned them from a stolen account. Teach employees to pause when a message changes where money will go, asks for secrecy, or creates pressure to skip a normal check.

3. Fake emails and stolen accounts

Some fake emails come from addresses that look almost correct. One letter may be changed, or the sender’s display name may match a real person while the full address does not.

Other messages come from a real account that a criminal has taken over. These can be harder to spot. The message may appear inside an existing conversation and use the person’s normal signature.

That is why checking spelling and email addresses is useful but not enough. A familiar sender does not prove that new banking details are safe. The FBI’s guide to business email compromise explains how criminals misuse trusted names and accounts.

4. Why safer sign-ins matter

A password is one lock on an account. Multifactor authentication, often called MFA, adds another check. It may ask someone to use an app, a security key, or another approved method when signing in.

Use MFA for company email, remote access, and other important services that support it. Ask your IT provider about methods designed to resist fake sign-in pages, such as security keys or passkeys. CISA recommends stronger sign-in protection and removing unnecessary accounts.

Employees should never approve a sign-in request they did not start. Report unexpected prompts instead. Use different passwords for different services and a company-approved password manager. MFA reduces risk, but it does not make every email or payment request trustworthy.

5. Why employee access matters

Each employee should have an individual account. Shared passwords make it harder to tell who opened a file, changed a setting, or sent a message.

Give people access to what they need for their jobs. A team member who schedules appointments may not need the same permissions as someone who approves payments. Limit accounts that can change security settings, and use separate accounts for those tasks when appropriate.

Review access when someone changes roles. When an employee leaves, promptly remove access to email, closing software, shared files, and remote tools. Arrange an approved handoff for ongoing work. These everyday habits are a key part of title company cybersecurity.

6. Why wire verification still matters

Strong IT security cannot confirm that every payment request is genuine. A buyer, seller, lender, or other outside party could have a compromised account even if your own systems are protected.

Follow your written wire verification process every time. Confirm instructions through a separate, trusted channel using contact information established independently. Do not use a phone number supplied in the message you are trying to verify. Calling that number could connect you to the criminal.

Treat changed instructions as a reason to stop and recheck. Follow your approval rules, record the verification, and explain the process to clients early. Encourage them to call a known office number before sending money. ALTA’s wire fraud guidance emphasizes using previously known contact information to verify instructions.

A deadline is never a reason to skip verification. Give employees clear authority to pause a payment when something does not match.

7. What to do if an account is compromised

If someone may have gained unauthorized access, act promptly. Do not wait to see whether another strange message arrives.

1. Protect the transaction. Alert your manager and pause affected payment activity. If funds may have been sent to a criminal, contact the sending bank’s fraud team immediately and request a recall. Report the fraud to FBI IC3. Recovery is not guaranteed.

2. Contact IT through a trusted channel. Use a known phone number rather than the suspected account. Have IT block unauthorized access, end active sign-ins, reset credentials, and check sign-in methods.

3. Check for hidden changes. IT should review account activity, connected apps, and email rules that forward or hide messages. A password reset alone may not remove every way the attacker can get back in.

4. Preserve and coordinate. Save original messages and transaction details. Follow your response plan with leadership, your insurer, underwriter, and legal adviser as appropriate. Warn affected parties through verified contact details.

Have IT confirm that the account is safe before normal use resumes. Microsoft’s compromised-account guidance provides technical steps for Microsoft 365 administrators.

8. A simple cybersecurity checklist for title companies

Review this list with your office manager, closing team, and IT provider:

• Use MFA and unique passwords for important accounts.

• Give every employee an individual sign-in.

• Limit access based on job duties and review it regularly.

• Remove former employees’ access promptly.

• Keep computers, browsers, and security tools updated.

• Monitor suspicious sign-ins and unexpected email forwarding.

• Practice spotting false payment requests without blaming employees.

• Verify wire instructions through your approved process.

• Keep bank, IT, and incident-response contacts easy to find.

• Maintain backups and test recovery for important business information.

Choose an owner for each item and set a review date. Backups can help restore information, but they cannot reverse a fraudulent wire. Payment checks and account protection must work together.

Support for your next step

Visit Altura Networks’ Title Company IT Support page to learn more. Title companies across Middle Tennessee are welcome to schedule a conversation about protecting email, employee access, and the technology behind their closings.